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Pledge Our Grievance To The Flag:
Could McCain-Feingold
Also Help Bring Young People Back to Politics?
All that's sacred, comes from youth
Dedications, nave and true
With no power... [we'll] remember ....
Why don't you?'
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal campaign finance reform remains a constant struggle against entrenched
power and maintaining our First Amendment rights.2 Yet at its foundation, campaign
finance reform involves recapturing our democratic ideals and empowering future gen-
erations.
In 1995, former U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater 3 articulated the central premise for
enacting comprehensive reform. He reasoned, "Senators and Representatives, faced
incessantly with the need to raise ever more funds to fuel their campaigns, can scarcely
avoid weighing every decision against the question, 'how will this affect my fundraising
prospects?,' rather than 'how will this affect the national interest?"'
4
Improving our nation's federal campaign financing system has experienced re-
newed momentum in recent years. Although President Clinton once argued that he pro-
vided wealthy donors "a respectful hearing, [not a] guaranteed result," 5 questions sur-
rounding his pardon of Marc Rich 6 and the 1996 Clinton/Gore fundraising practices
7
brought heightened focus. The 1998 re-election victory of U.S. Senator Russell Fein-
gold8 raised greater awareness 9 and the intense media focus on U.S. Senator John
1. E. VEDDER, PEARL JAM, Not For You, on VrrALOGY (Epic Records 1994).
2. However, "[it is highly unlikely that the ratifiers of the First Amendment had any specific intentions
at all on the topic of campaign finance, but even if they did, why would we want to be bound by their specific
intentions when the words they ratified do not require it?" Edward B. Foley, Philosophy, the Constitution and
Campaign Finance, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23, at 25 (1998).
3. In 1964, Senator Goldwater also secured the Republican presidential nomination.
4. 145 CONG. REC. S12,661 (daily ed. October 15, 1999) (statement of Sen. Daschle quoting Sen.
Goldwater).
5. Kathleen Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663 (1997) cit-
ing Excerpts From the First News Conference of Clinton's Second Term, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1997, at B6.
6. See Carter M. Young, Does 'Soft Money' Really Matter?, ABCNEWS.COM, Mar. 19, 2001, avail-
able at http://dailynews.yahoo.comih/abc/20010319/pllcampaign-financeO10319_1 .html.
7. See Nancy Gibbs & Michael Duffy, Legal Tender, Mar. 17, 1997, available at
http:llwww.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/03/10timeldonorgate.htmnl.
8. Despite a $1 million blitzkrieg of Republican television attacks spearheaded by U.S. Senator Mitch
McConnell, Kentucky's high profile campaign finance reform opponent, Senator Feingold successfully gam-
bled his re-election chances on his commitment to campaign finance reform. See The 1998 CAMPAIGN:
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McCain's competitive 2000 campaign for Republican presidential nomination continues
to foster public interest. 1 More importantly, both Senator McCain and Senator Feingold
remain lead advocates for promising reform legislation before Congress."
In the 2000 presidential election, partly in response to McCain's national emer-
gence, both major party nominees visibly addressed campaign finance reform. The De-
mocratic nominee, Vice President Al Gore, promised that McCain-Feingold would be
the first piece of legislation he would send to Congress. 12 Gore also proposed a $7.1
billion "Democracy Endowment.' 3 Designed to help minimize the rising costs of fed-
eral campaigns and better allow for wider participation in the campaign process, the
proposal called for a voluntary public financing system of congressional campaigns.14
Not surprisingly, Republican nominee Governor George W. Bush selected a differ-
ent approach to campaign finance reform. Bush opposed McCain-Feingold and rejected
steps toward voluntary public financing of congressional campaigns. Instead, Bush
called for banning "soft money"' 15 donations by corporations and labor unions and urged
WISCONSIN; Campaign Funds at Center of Wisconsin Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at Al. Refusing
accept special interest money, Senator Feingold maintained, "[n]o career, including mine, is as important as
breaking the hold of this system of legalized bribery. The issue is my issue now." Id.
9. Senator Feingold's victory challenges Bradley A. Smith's premise that voters do not care about the
issue. See Bradley A. Smith, A Most Uncommon Cause: Some Thoughts on Campaign Reform and A Response
to Professor Paul, 30 U. CONN. L. REV. 831, 833-835 (1998).
10. Senator McCain's presidential campaign remains especially unique because campaign finance re-
form stood as one of his central issues. However, for Senator McCain's New Hampshire primary victory, "just
9 percent of voters cited campaign finance reform as the most important issue in their vote, placing it fifth out
of seven issues tested." Dan Merkle, Poll: Few Demand Campaign Reform, ABCNEWS.COM, Mar. 27, 2001,
available at http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/abe/20010327/pl/poll0l0327_1 .html.
11. See S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter McCain-Feingold]. The comparable bill in the U.S. House
of Representatives is H.R. 380, 107th Cong. (2001). There have been other campaign finance proposals, see S.
22, 107th Cong. (2001) (creating a monthly election year filing requirement for Senate and House candidates,
providing for public inspection of broadcast time requests by federal candidates, limiting yearly soft money
donations to $60,000, and raising individual, political committee, national party, and senate campaign commit-
tee contribution limits); H.R. 1039, 107th Cong. (2001) (also requiring better reporting, limiting soft money
contributions, and increasing individual contribution limits); H.R. 1867, 106th Cong. (1999) (prohibiting
national political parties and federal candidates from raising and using soft money in federal elections and
requiring disclosure of broadcast communications referring to federal candidates); H.R. 1922, 106th Cong.
(1999) (requiring disclosure of all national party fund transfers to state and local parties); H.R. 2668, 106th
Cong. (1999) (mandating disclosure of all national party fund transfers to state and local affiliates, regardless
if funds are regulated by federal election law). However, because of the popularity attached to the bill's spon-
sor and co-sponsor, this Note will solely focus on McCain-Feingold.
12. See GORE/LIEBERMAN 2000, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, available at
http://www.algore.com/campaign financereform/cfr.agendal .htmi (last visited Oct. 25, 2000) (all cited
Gore/Lieberman website information on file with Journal of Legislation).
13. For a more detailed proposal on publicly financing federal elections see generally Richard Briffault,
Point/Counterpoint: Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563 (1999); Rep. Harold
Ford Jr. & Jason M. Levin, A New Horizon for Campaign Finance Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307 (2000).
14. See GORE-LIEBERMAN 2000, supra, note 12.
15. Although undefined by federal regulation, soft money refers to campaign funds not raised or used in




increasing the individual maximum contribution level to adjust with inflation.
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This Note will illustrate the need for federal campaign finance reform in reconnect-
ing young voters17 to the political process. Finally, this Note will examine current law
and recommend that the U.S. Congress and President George W. Bush take the crucial
first step and enact McCain-Feingold.
H. YOUNG PEOPLE AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Although adhering to a generational obligation to refine democratic inconsistencies
appears noble, great resistance remains toward altering the current campaign finance
system. Reform opponents emphasize the constitutional right to use private property to
voice public political opinion. 18 In the tradition of laissez-faire, anti-reformers relying on
a strict reading of the Constitution dismiss media reports of historic abuse and repeat-
edly block progressive intervention. They argue for leaving the system untouched or
completely de-regulating the current scheme.' 9
However, this view of our campaign finance system is profoundly misguided. First
Amendment rights are not absolute,2 ° and the intensity of today's media offers young
[Flunds raised by Presidential campaigns and national congressional political party organizations
purportedly for use by state and local party organizations in non-federal elections, from sources
who would otherwise be barred from making such contributions in connection with a federal el-
ection, e.g., from corporations and labor unions and from individuals who have reached their fe-
deral contribution limits.
Common Cause v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 692 F. Supp. 1391 at 1392 (D.D.C. 1987) (quoting Common
Cause's petition). Hard money is also not expressly defined by federal regulation; however, it entails campaign
funds subject to federal contribution and source limits, used and solicited in connection with federal candi-
dates. See generally 2 U.S.C § 441a (1994).
16. See BUSH-CHENEY 2000, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, available at
http://www.georgewbush.com/issues/campaignfin.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2000).
17. Referring to 18-24 year old voters.
18. See generally Foley, supra note 2, at 23 (contrasting this libertarian view with campaign egalitarian-
ism, which argues for financial equality of political process in examining social inequality).
19. See generally William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance For Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Nw.
U. L. REV. 335 (2000) (urging a decentralization of federal campaign finance regulation); John Copeland
Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign Finance Legislation, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 69 (2000) (calling
for reform legislation mandating that congressional members recuse themselves from legislation directly
affecting contributors); Bradley A. Smith, A Most Uncommon Cause: Some Thoughts on Campaign Reform
and a Response to Professor Paul, 30 U. CONN. L. REV. 831 (1998) (critiquing the various aims of McCain-
Feingold); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and UnDemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance
Reform, 105 YALE L. REV. 1049 (1996) (arguing that current media attention overemphasizes the need for
reform; campaigns funded with large contributions are equally democratic to those funded with small contri-
butions; money does not buy elections; nor is money a corrupting influence on politicians); Kathleen Sullivan,
Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663 (1997) (confronting pro-campaign fi-
nance reform assumptions such as voting and political inequality, denial of voter preference, corruption of
legislators and the legislative agenda, and decline in debate quality).
20. See generally EUGENE VOLOKH, FIRST AMENDMENT: LAW, CASES, PROBLEMS, & POLICY
ARGUMENTS (forthcoming 2001) (illustrating various U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the First Amend-
ment). "It is ironic that the current regime is defended on the basis of First Amendment values when so little
real debate takes place and so many incumbents are able to eschew live discussion in favor of superficial
2001]
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Americans far greater insight into political corruption and influence, how it works, and
why it should be changed. If we are to increase young voter participation, allow issue-
merit to dictate legislative action, and improve future opportunity for all to competi-
tively seek federal public office, enacting campaign finance reform is vital. As Archi-
bald Cox proclaimed, "[w]e can't survive as a self-governing people if it doesn't hap-
pen. 21
A. Young Voter Apathy
Conquering voter apathy and re-instating confidence in government, especially with
young voters, is the first critical reason for enacting campaign finance reform. For the
2000 presidential election, with neither candidate significantly leading in the polls up
until Election Day, preliminary reports argued that only 51% of all eligible voters exer-
cised their right to vote.22
A closer examination of recent youth voting patterns reveals significant apathy with
our current political system. During the 1998 election cycle, 39.2% of eligible young
voters were registered, while only 16.6% voted.23 In 1996, a presidential election year,
48.8% of 18-24 year olds were able to vote, but just 32.4% actually went to the polls.
24
Young voters have good reason for apathy. In the 2000 presidential election, most key
campaign issues did not pertain to young people.2 5 Because they lack necessary re-
sources, many young people do not feel that their viewpoints are considered, let alone
adequately represented. 26 Senator Feingold confirms, "[w]ithout question, big contribu-
attack and voice over ads issued as unreturnable sallies." Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional
Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Campaigns, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, at
1183 (1994).
21. John B. Anderson, Campaign Finance: The Impact On the Legislative and Regulatory Process, 50
ADMIN L. REV. 81, at 83 (1998) quoting Conversation with Archibald Cox, HARv. L. BULL., at 10 (Summer
1997).
22. See John Dean, Why American's Don't Vote- and How That Might Change, Nov. 8, 2000, available
at http://www.cnn.com/20O/LAW/ll/columns/fl.dean.voters.02.11.07/. Because official data has not been
published by the United State Census Bureau, this Note was not able to include in- depth analysis regarding
the 2000 election.
23. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, REPORTED VOTING AND REGISTRATION, BY SEX AND SINGLE YEARS OF
AGE: NOVEMBER, 1998, available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting/cps1998/tab0l.txt
(last visited Nov. 20, 2000).
24. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, REPORTED VOTING AND REGISTRATION, BY RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN,
AND AGE, FOR STATES: NOVEMBER 1996, available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting
96cps/tab4A.txt (last visited Nov. 20, 2000).
25. An examination of the "issues sections" on the campaign websites of Vice President Al Gore and
Governor George W. Bush illustrates that only four of the thirty-two different "issue sections" potentially
pertained to general youth interests. Those sections were education, abortion, environment, and campaign
finance reform. See generally BUSH-CHENEY 2000, ISSUES, available at http://www.georgewbush.com (last
visited Oct. 25, 2000); GORE/LIEBERMAN 2000, ISSUES, available at http://www.algore.com (last visited Oct.
25, 2000).
26. A 2000 study by the non-partisan Campaign Study Group, found that 68% of today's young voters,
18-24 years old, felt ignored by the current political system and only 55% believed that voting would make a
[Vol. 27:2
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tors give donations to influence the work of Congress. So today, when Congress debates
the issues that affect your lives, you have every reason to wonder if [their] campaign




Another reason to support campaign finance reform involves challenging political
parties and elected officials to respond to issue-merit, not well-financed special interest
donors.2 9 As mentioned by Barry Goldwater's remarks,3 ° most federal legislators cur-
rently depend on large contributions to finance their campaigns. In turn, wealthy special
interests can easily control votes on particular pieces of legislation with campaign dona-
tions. 31 As witnessed by federal legislators, special interests can also dictate a party's
entire legislative agenda. Veteran U.S. Representative John B. Anderson maintains:
[T]he current campaign finance system is designed to achieve stasis - inaction which
will not disturb the status quo of those who are fairly well off and intend to keep it
that way. The proof lies among the thousand bills that flood the hopper in the House
but never see the light of day, let alone debate and discussion, nor are they intended
to.
32
difference. By contrast, in 1968, 88% of young voters felt that voting could bring change. See Madhusmita
Bora, Gen Y Different From Its Predecessors, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE available at
http://www.yvote2000.com/Archive/200017/24-37958.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2001). Even at their own
universities, students are being overlooked in favor of campaign contributors. At the University of Wisconsin,
University of Texas, University of California-Berkley, and University of Washington, nearly all of the recent
appointees to the various Boards of Regents were influential contributors to that state's current governor. See
PUBLICCAMPAIGN.ORG, WHY STUDENTS SHOULD CARE . .. ABOUT CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, available
at http://www.publiccampaign.org/newsletters/students.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2000).
27. Reuters, Democrats: Fundraising Changes Would Restore Faith, Mar. 24, 2001, available at
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm120010324/pl/demsfinance dc1 .html quoting Senator Russell Feingold,
Democratic Weekly Radio Address, (Mar. 24, 2001).
28. Issue-merit refers lawmakers debating the actual national interest behind proposed legislation with-
out contemplating past, present, and future special interest campaign contributions. While lawmakers will
receive contributions from philosophically like-minded individuals and groups, Senator Charles Schumer
correctly connects reform with creating more issue-merit debate. He argues,
[b]ut how about if Senator C believes that a certain facility or company needs dollars to bring jobs
to his area and receives contributions closely related to that? Everyone doubts it.... Every -
every - move we make in Washington is now under a cloud. It is under a cloud because of
the system by which we finance campaigns. We must change it.
145 CONG. REC. S12,595 (daily ed. October 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
29. "[Mlore and more young Americans see action as a solution to the powerlessness they feel in the po-
litical process." All Things Considered: Growing Youth Volunteerism Coupled With Youth Absence In The
Voting Booth (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 3, 2000) (transcript on file with Journal of Legislation).
While increased volunteerism remains encouraging, political disenfranchisement's negative influence deserves
correction.
30. See supra note 4.
31. See generally Thomas Stratmann, The Market For Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions
Everything?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 85 (1998).
32. Anderson, supra note 21, at 86.
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The amount donated to political parties also indicates the way special interests, not
young voters, dominate legislative priorities. Regarding student loan repayment, an
issue affecting the financial future of many young people, big money contributions have
thwarted recent progress. A proposal by U.S. Representative Harold Ford Jr. and U.S.
Senator Charles Schumer, called the "1999 Make College Affordable Act," 33 simply
amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide full tax deductions for higher
education expenses 34 and interest on student loans.35 However, the Republican congres-
sional majority buried the bill in committee.
36
The stalemate is not surprising if one examines comparative congressional cam-
paign contributions. 37 As compiled from Federal Election Commission (FEC) data by
the non-partisan Center for Responsive Politics, the commercial finance industry con-
tributed heavily to Congress. As of November 2, 2000, the industry donated $222 mil-
lion to federal candidates and committees during the 2000 election cycle, over three-
fifths going to Republicans. 38 During the 1998 cycle, the industry donated almost $150
million, three-fifths given to Republicans. 39 During that same period, education-related
contributions were virtually non-existent. Education-related donations to federal candi-
dates and committees totaled only $12 million, with 57% going to Democrats. 40 During
the 1998 cycle, education-related giving was just $8 million, with 70% going to Democ-
rats.41 As a result, dominant monetary pressure from the commercial finance industry
virtually guaranteed deadlock. An issue simply designed to help students and parents
42ease the increasing cost of a modern-day economic necessity did not stand a chance.
The current system prohibited serious contemplation on the strengths or weakness of an
33. See generally H.R. 2750, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1974, 106th Cong. (1999).
34. Higher education expenses refer to an educational institution's tuition and fees, related to academic
instruction, while a student attends. See H.R. 2750, § 221(c); S. 1974, § 222(c).
35. The fully deductible interest portion would be for the amount equal to the interest paid on any quali-
fied education loan. See H.R. 2750, § 221(d); S. 1974, § 25B(a).
36. See supra note 33. The Ford proposal never left the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Schumer proposal was read twice and did not exit the Senate Finance Committee.
37. For the purpose of comparison, this Note assumes that the commercial finance contributors would
favor maintaining the current state of higher education finance, which allows only limited tax deductions for
higher education expenses and increases the need for securing variable interest financial loans. In addition, this
Note presupposes that education-related contributors would advocate reforming the current system and mini-
mizing the necessity for securing variable interest financial loans.
38. See OPENSECRETS.ORG, FINANcE/INSURANcE/REAL ESTATE: LONG TERM CONTRIBUTION TRENDS,
available at http://www.opensecrets.orglindustries/indus.asp?Ind=F (last visited Nov. 20, 2000).
39. See id.
40. See OPENSECRETS.ORG, EDUCATION: LONG-TERM CONTRBUTION TRENDS, available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=W04 (last visited Nov. 20, 2000).
41. See id.
42. "There is also little doubt that political campaign contributions get results." John J. Sweeney, Cam-




under-represented issue and simply rewarded the power of those able to contribute.43
C. Future Candidate Viability
The exclusionary consequences surrounding increasingly expensive congressional
campaigns 44 provide a final reason for enacting reform. The present system unfairly
favors incumbents and essentially denies present and future candidates of modest means
and personal connections from successfully winning federal office. Senator McCain
acknowledges how the current scheme discourages young voters and future candidates,
"[tlhey say they will not run for public office, that they believe we are corrupt... that is
causing young Americans to divorce themselves from the political process.,
45
Historically, due to their unlimited access to contributors, incumbents have been able to
raise far more money than challengers. During the 1998 and 2000 election cycles, U.S.
Senate and House Democratic incumbents amassed over $360 million, while Democ-
ratic challengers gathered only $163 million.46 During the same time period, Senate and
House Republican incumbents raised $450 million, while GOP challengers only col-
lected $134 million.4 7
Because they can utilize their financial advantage for extensive television adver-
tisements, direct mailings, and "get-out-the-vote" efforts (GOTV), incumbents currently
enjoy incredibly high re-election rates. The 1998 and 2000 election cycles proved no
different. In 1998, U.S. Senate incumbents won 90% of their races. 48 In 2000, 83%
proved victorious. In the U.S. House of Representatives, incumbents won 98% of their
races during the 1998 and 2000 elections. 49 As a result, our current campaign finance
structure unequivocally maintains power and discourages change and fresh ideas. This is
not only a tremendous disservice to those without monetary and personal influence, but
stymies political, social, and economic progress for those who may need it most.
Consequently, the only competitive method to counter inequity in the system now
appears to involve self-financing campaigns. The 2000 elections were glaring proof that
43. See Burt Neubrone, Campaign Finance Reform: The Constitutional Questions: Buckley's Analytical
Flaws, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 11l, at 113 (1997) (Stating that "[t]he only ideas we hear are ideas that can raise
enough money to be heard").
44. During the last ten years, the cost of running a successful U.S. congressional race skyrocketed. In
1990, winning U.S. Senate candidates solicited almost $120 million. In 2000, successful U.S. Senate candi-
dates raised almost $250 million. In 1990, winning U.S. House candidates compiled almost $194 million; in
2000, they amassed almost $400 million. See Press Release, Fed. Election Comm'n, Congressional Financial
Activity Soars for 2000, (Jan. 9, 2001) available at http://fecwebl .fec.gov/press/post-general2000.htm.
45. 145 CONG. REC. S12,586 (daily ed. October 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. McCain).
46. See FED. ELECTION COMM'N, FINANCIAL ACTIVtTY OF GENERAL ELECTION CONGRESSIONAL
CANDIDATES - 1990-2000, available at http://www.fec.gov/press/cansum2Opre.htm (last modified Nov. 3,
2000).
47. See id.
48. See Darrell West, Analysis of 2000 Election, available at




only those with vast personal wealth can now viably seek federal office. In his success-
ful run for New Jersey's open U.S. Senate seat, Democrat John Corzine spent nearly $53
million of his own fortune.50 Minnesota Democratic challenger Mark Dayton's victori-
ous Senate campaign cost him nearly $9 million. 5' In Washington State, Democratic
challenger Maria Cantwell spent almost $8 million to defeat incumbent Republican
Senator Slade Gorton.52 Narrowly losing West Virginia's open 2nd District U.S. House
race, Democrat James F. Humphrey spent over $5.5 million. 53 Losing to House incum-
bent Robert Barr in Georgia's competitive 7th District race, Democratic challenger
Roger F. Kahn used nearly $3 million.54 In Texas' 25th District, losing Republican
House challenger Phil Sudan spent $2.5 million. To narrowly win New Jersey's 7th
District open House seat, Republican Mike Ferguson spent over $600,000.56 To retain
Louisiana's 1st District House seat, Republican incumbent David Vitter spent over
$400,000.7
Unfortunately, under our current system, political competition is fast becoming a
game for the extraordinarily wealthy. In maintaining the status quo, we exclude and
discourage the best and brightest solely for lack of financial and personal resource. This
not only deprives the public of quality leadership, but creates a government that fails to
accurately reflect the citizens and values it purports to represent.
m. RELEVANT CASE LAW
The key U.S. Supreme Court case in analyzing campaign finance reform remains
Buckley v. Valeo.58 In Buckley, the Court considered the constitutionality of the 1974
amendments to the Federal Campaign Act (FECA).59 In response to President Nixon's
Watergate scandal, the 1974 amendments60 limited political expenditures and contribu-
tions, created optional public financing for presidential elections, and implemented dis-
closure and reporting requirements.
In its decision, the Buckley Court upheld disclosure and reporting requirements
6 1
50. See OPENSECRETS.ORG, Election Overview: The Story So Far, available at





55. See OPENSECRETS.ORG, Election Overview: The Story So Far, available at
http://www.opensecrets.orgl2000electlstorysofar/topraces.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2000).
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
59. See generally Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codi-
fied as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431-456 (1994)).
60. See generally Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 86 Stat.
1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431-456 (1994)).
61. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58, 60-85.
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and optional public financing for presidential elections.6 z The Court also maintained that
congressional limits on contributions to candidates, political parties, and political action
committees (PACs) survived strict scrutiny.63 Although campaign contributions in-
volved First Amendment rights, the Court maintained that assuring a federal government
free of apparent or actual corruption 64 qualified as a compelling state interest worthy of
congressional regulation. 65
However, the Court maintained that Congress could not restrict expenditures by
candidates, PACs, or individuals. 66 In its opinion, the majority stated, "[t]hese provi-
sions place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and
associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First
Amendment cannot tolerate." 67 Specifically, the Court did not feel that expenditure ceil-
ings were justified by a compelling government interest in curbing corruption or its
appearance.68
In 1981, the Court decided California Medical Association v. Federal Election
Commission69 and upheld contribution limits to political committees regarding issue
advocacy. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought action against the Califor-
nia Medical Association (CMA) for accepting contributions exceeding $5,000 to its own
PAC (CALPAC). 70 The CMA challenged the constitutionality of the $5,000 contribution
limit as an unlawful expenditure limit.7 1 Delivering the plurality opinion, Justice Mar-
shall found that CMA's contributions to CALPAC equaled "speech by proxy '72 and
rejected CMA's claim that limiting contributions to CALPAC deprived CMA of First
Amendment protection.73 Justice Marshall argued that the yearly $5,000 contribution
62. See id. at 85-109.
63. Strict scrutiny refers to the judicial technique for evaluating First Amendment issues. To survive
strict scrutiny, a statute must serve a compelling state interest, and be narrowly tailored to serve the compelling
state interest. See generally VOLOKH, supra note 20. Specifically, the Buckley Court argued, "[FECA's] con-
tribution limitations in themselves do not undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and effec-
tive discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the institutional press,
candidates, and political parties." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28-29.
64. Nine years later, the Court more explicitly defined corruption as when "[e]lected officials are influ-
enced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions
of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political
favors." Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, at 497 (1985).
65. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-38.
66. See id. at 39-59. The Court struck down regulations regarding independent expenditures, candidate
expenditures from personal funds, and overall campaign expenditures.
67. Id. at 58-59.
68. See id. at 45, 54-56.
69. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
70. See id. at 185-86.
71. See id. at 193-99 (Marshall J., plurality).
72. See id. at 196 (Marshall J., plurality).
73. See id. at 195-97 (Marshall J., plurality). Justice Marshall argued,
If the First Amendment rights of a contributor are not infringed by limitations on the
amount he may contribute to a campaign organization which advocates the views
and candidacy of a particular candidate, the rights of a contributor are similarly not
2001]
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limit to PACs for issue advocacy 74 is constitutional, regardless of whether First
Amendment rights are impaired. 75 Although actual or apparent corruption was not at
issue, Justice Marshall viewed FECA's PAC contribution limit as a "useful supplement"
in "protecting the integrity of its legislative scheme.,
76
The Court revisited the corruption rationale in Federal Election Commission v. Na-
tional Conservative Political Action Committee77 (NCPAC) and Federal Election Com-
mission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life78 (MCFL). Both organizations operated as
corporations; NCPAC was a political committee79 and MCFL operated as a non-profit,
pro-life organization interested with issue advocacy and elections. 80 In National Conser-
vative Political Action Committee, the Court struck down a $1,000 independent expendi-
ture limitation in publicly funded presidential campaigns. 81 The Court eschewed Mar-
shall's "useful supplement" and "speech by proxy" arguments.82 Evidently, hypothetical
corruption "was not enough to show that a particular political activity posed the danger
to corrupt influence or even its appearance.,
83
In Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 84 the Court also failed to find requisite corrup-
tion in the organization's letter to members and the public rating specific candidates
against the organization's ideas.85 The FEC brought suit against MCFL for violating 2
U.S.C. § 441(b)'s corporate independent expenditure restriction. 86 However, the Court
found that MCFL "was formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital. 87
Subsequently, the Court rejected a broad "prophylactic rule' 88 regulating all independent
corporate spending and differentiated MCFL from other corporations. 89 Today, MFCL
and similar ideological organizations can make independent expenditures if they have
expressly formed for a political purpose, do not conduct business activities, and their
impaired by limits on the amount he may give to a multicandidate political commit-
tee, such as CALPAC, which advocates the views and candidacies of a number of
candidates.
Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 197 (1981) (Marshall J., plurality).
74. See 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(2)(a).
75. See Cal. Med. Ass'n, at 196-97 (Marshall J., plurality).
76. Id. at 199, n.20 (Marshall J., plurality).
77. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
78. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
79. See Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 490.
80. See Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 241-42.
81.- See generally 26 U.S.C. § 9001-9003 (1997).
82. See Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 495-96.
83. Robert F. Bauer, The Demise of Reform: Buckley v. Valeo, the Courts, and the "Corruption Ration-
ale," 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 11, at 14 (1998) (commenting on the Court's decision in NCPAC).
84. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
85. See Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 243-46, 259.
86. See id. at 241. 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) prohibits corporations from making non-segregated contributions
or expenditures on behalf of candidates for any political office. See 2 U.S.C. § 441(b).
87. See Mass. Citizens for Life, at 259.




members lack a financial stake in the organization. Labor or business cannot form these
groups, nor can ideological organizations accept labor and business contributions. 90
In Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,91 the Court tackled independent
expenditures by non-ideological corporations that supported or attacked individual can-
didates for state office. 92 The majority found that the state possessed a compelling inter-
est in regulating corporate independent expenditures. 93 The Court argued that
"[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of
independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of political contribu-
tions. '94 Further, the majority found that the state narrowly tailored its ban on non-
segregated95 corporate treasury money in elections. 96 The Court maintained that the ban
did not "impose an absolute ban on all forms of corporate political spending, but permits
corporations to make independent political expenditures through separate segregated
funds."97 Most importantly, Austin illustrates the ability to constitutionally regulate cor-
porate participation in the campaign finance scheme, 98 regardless of Buckley's contribu-
tion/expenditure distinction."
In 1996, the Court dealt with congressional regulation of political party spending in
connection with a U.S. senatorial campaign. 0 0 In a plurality opinion, the Court held that
the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee's advertisement expenditure,
attacking the likely Democratic candidate, was not coordinated with a particular candi-
date. 01 Thus, FECA's "Party Expenditure Provision",' 0 2 was unconstitutional when ap-
plied to independent expenditures. 0 3 Under Buckley, because the state committee's
90. See id. at 264.
91. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
92. See id. at 655.
93. See id. at 659-60.
94. Id. at 660.
95. Non-segregated refers to the corporate account to which contributors donated without full knowl-
edge that those funds would be used for the corporation's political purposes. See id.
96. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
97. Id.
98. See Daniel M. Yarmish, Note, The Constitutional Basis for a Ban On Soft Money, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1257, at 1275 (1998).
99. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,58-59 (1976).
100. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996). The
key issue involved whether the state committee has violated FECA's "Party Expenditure Provision," 2 U.S.C
§441(a)(d)(3), which limits party expenditures in a senatorial race to $20,000 or two cents multiplied by a
state's voting age population.
101. See Colo. Republican, at 613-14.
102. See generally, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(1). The provision exempts political parties from the $5,000 con-
tribution limits imposed under § 441a(a)(4) and $5,000 coordinated expenditure regulation from §
441 a(a)(7)(B)(i).
103. See Colo. Republican, at 618. Moreover, the Court did not find concern with the potentially corrup-
tive effect of independent expenditures. "[T]his Court's opinions suggest that Congress wrote the Party Expen-
diture Provision not so much because of a special concern about the potentially "corrupting" effect of party
expenditures, but rather for the constitutionally insufficient purpose of reducing what it saw as wasteful and
excessive campaign spending, Id. at 618.
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expenditures were not coordinated with any particular candidate, the Court held that
political parties possessed a constitutional right to make unlimited independent expendi-
tures." 4 Avoiding the contribution issue, the Court's ruling has greatly influenced the
widespread solicitation and use of soft money in today's campaign finance system.'0 5
In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the Court recently upheld Buckley's
contribution limits for state elections. 10 6 In addition, various justices signaled for a re-
examination of the campaign finance system created by Buckley and its progeny. In
reiterating its concern with the corruptive role money can play in the political process,
the Court argued "[l]eave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical
assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to
take part in democratic governance.
10 7
In separate opinions, other justices laid a solid foundation to constitutionally enact
new campaign finance reform legislation, even overturn Buckley. Justice Stevens bluntly
stated:
Money is property; it is not speech. Speech has the power to inspire volunteers to per-
form a multitude of tasks on a campaign trail, on a battleground, or even on a football
field. Money meanwhile has the power to pay hired laborers to perform the same
tasks. It does not follow, however, that the First Amendment provides the same meas-
ure of protection to the use of money to accomplish such goals as it provides to the
use of ideas to achieve the same results.1
0 8
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, maintained that "a decision to contribute
money to a campaign is a matter of First Amendment concern - not because money is
speech (it is not); but because it enables speech."'0 9 Countering a presumption against
constitutionality when considering campaign finance reform efforts, Justice Breyer at-
tacked the literal meaning of the Court's language in Buckley." 0 Breyer argued, "[t]he
Constitution often permits restrictions on the speech of some in order to prevent a few
from drowning out the many - in Congress, for example, where constitutionally pro-
tected debate, ART. 1, §6, is limited to provide every Member an equal opportunity to
express his or her views.""' More importantly, Justice Breyer signaled concern that
Buckley and its progeny should grant Congress the flexibility to ensure political integ-
104. See id. at613-15.
105. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, at 414 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
106. See Nixon, at 397-98.
107. Id. at 390.
108. Id. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring).
110. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401-02 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). Specifi-
cally, Breyer took issue with, "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others [as] wholly foreign to the First Amendment.
Buckley v. Valet, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
111. Nixon, at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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rity.1 2 If not, Justice Breyer felt the Constitution required the Court to reconsider the
decision.' 
13
Dissenting in Nixon, Justice Kennedy also provided real hope for new constitutional
campaign finance reform.1 14 Lamenting the structure devised under Buckley and Colo-
rado Republican, Justice Kennedy maintained that "[t]he Court has forced a substantial
amount of political speech underground, as contributors and candidates devise ever
more elaborate methods of avoiding contribution limits, limits which take into account
of rising campaign costs . . .This mocks the First Amendment."'115 Justice Kennedy
went further by stating a willingness to overrule Buckley, and allow Congress to enact
campaign finance reform limiting both contributions and expenditures. 1
6
IV. CAMPAIGN FINANCE TODAY
The resulting hard money guidelines from Buckley and its progeny still dictate. In-
dividual contributions to candidates may not exceed $1,000 per election, primary and
general. 117 Individual donations to political committees cannot exceed $5,000 per
year.1 8 Aggregate individual contributions cannot exceed $25,000 per calendar year." 
9
Political committee contributions to candidates or other political committees may not
exceed $5,000.120 National political parties may not accept individual contributions over
$20,000 per year. 121 National political parties can only accept $15,000 per year from
political committees. 122 Labor unions and corporations are both prohibited from directly
donating money "in connection" with federal campaigns. 123 The discrepancy that now
allows for far more unregulated money to enter the campaign system involves the
method that FECA uses in defining expenditures. Instead of subjecting national political
parties to the $5,000 limit for contributions to candidates, 124 FECA treats party expendi-
tures on behalf of a specific candidate as an expenditure. 125 Under this dichotomy, the
hard/soft money expenditure distinction now also exists.
The current hard/soft money controversy emanates from a 1978 Federal Election
112. See id. at 404 (Breyer, J., concurring).
113. See id. at 405 (Breyer, J., concurring).
114. See id. at 405-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
116. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,409-10 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
117. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A).
118. See id. § 441a(a)(1)(C).
119. See id. § 441a(a)(3).
120. See id. § 441a(a)(2)(A); § 441 a(a)(2)(C).
121. See id. § 441a(a)(1)(B).
122. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(B).
123. See id. § 441b(a).
124. See id, § 441a(a)(2)(A).
125. See id. § 441a(a)(d)(1). FECA's contribution limits also do not apply transfers between and among
national, state, district or local political party committees. See id. § 441 a(a)(d)(4).
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Commission Advisory Opinion. 126 In the ruling, the FEC declared that national political
parties (Democrat and Republican) could use money not subject to FECA 12 7 for generic
voter registration, and GOTV and benefit both state and federal candidates.
2 8
In response to a 1984 lawsuit brought by Common Cause, 129 a non-partisan pro-
reform organization, the FEC attempted to specify its hard/soft money distinction. Its
new changes created dual hard/soft money account system for national political par-
ties.1 30 For money spent in connection with federal candidates, the national parties must
use regulated hard money.' 3' For coordinated administrative costs 13 2 that aid both fed-
eral and non-federal candidates, national parties must also use hard money.1
33
However, for coordinated administrative costs the national parties can also use un-
regulated soft money. In presidential election years, the national parties must pay for at
least 65% of administrative costs with hard money. Conversely, they can spend ul to
35% with soft money.' 34 Abusing this restriction and 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(d)(4), national
parties increasingly assign large sums of soft money to state parties. State laws are often
far more lenient regarding the use of soft money. Thus, national parties increasingly
raise more soft money, transfer it to the states, and still benefit their federal candi-
dates.1
35
For soft money advertisements, the key issue involves whether the advertisement
contains an electioneering message. 136 In 1995, the FEC ruled that national parties must
use hard money to pay for advertisements with an electioneering message. 137 Thus, na-
tional parties can pay for non-electioneering message advertisements with soft-money.
As a result, both parties now exploit the current ambiguity by using soft money to fund
126. See Fed. Election Comm'n., Advisory Op. 1978-10 (1978) available at http://herndon3.sdrdc..com/
ao/ao/780010.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2001).
127. Soft money. See supra text accompanying note 15.
128. See id.
129. See Common Cause v. Fed. Election Comm'n., 692 F. Supp. 1391 (D.D.C. 1987).
130. See generally 11 C.F.R. §106.5 (1997).
131. See id. §106.5(a).
132. See id. §106.5(a)(2)(i)-(iv). These include direct fundraising costs, voter registration, rent, GOTV,
volunteer campaign literature leafleting, and sample ballot creation and distribution.
133. See id. §106.5(b)(1). However, Democratic and Republican U.S. Senatorial Committees (DSCC &
NRSC), and Democratic and Republican U.S. House Committees (DCCC & NRCC) are subject to different
rules, and can use some soft money that benefit both federal and non-federal candidates. See id. § 106.5(c).
134. See id. §106.5(b)(2)(ii). In non-presidential years, the national parties only need to pay for 60% of
administrative costs with hard money.
135. See Note, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1323, 1327-28 (1998) citing Lisa Rosenberg, A Bag of Trick: Loop-
holes in the Campaign Finance Systems, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, available at http://www.
opensecrets.org/pubs/law-bagtricks/contents.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
136. See Fed. Election Comm'n., Advisory Op. 1985-14 (1985) quoting United States v. United Auto
Workers, 352 U.S. 567, at 587 (1957) available at http://hemdon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/850014.html (last visited
Mar. 20, 2001). An electioneering message vaguely refers to statements "designed to urge the public to elect a
certain candidate or party." Id.
137. See Fed. Election Comm'n Advisory Op. 1995-25 (1995) available at
http://herndon3.sdrdc.comao/ao/950025.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2001).
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"issue ads" implicitly designed to elect federal candidates and congressional majorities
for the national political parties. 1
38
In the end, we now endure a campaign finance system widely manipulated by na-
tional parties beholden to the corrupting monetary influence FECA seeks to regulate.
139
From January 1, 1999 through October 18, 2000 both major parties combined to raise
almost $1 billion. 140 Compared to 1995-96, while 2000 hard money solicitation in-
creased only 6% for Republicans and 24% for Democrats; 2000 soft money receipts
soared.4 1 Republican soft money receipts increased 74% and Democratic soft money
receipts jumped 85%. 142 According to the FEC, "soft money now represents 42% of all
National Republican Party financial activity and 53% of Democratic National Party
fundraising."'
143
V. THE MCCAIN-FEINGOLD LEGISLATION
McCain-Feingold' 44 reigns as the most recent high-profile attempt at improving our
current campaign finance system. The legislation amends the FECA in a number of
ways. To begin, the bill defines federal election activity. 45 Specifically, federal election
activity involves voter registration that begins 120 days before a scheduled federal elec-
tion, and ends the day of the election. 146 The definition also includes voter identification,
GOTV, and basic campaign activity for a federal candidate that appears on the ballot.
147
McCain-Feingold also characterizes federal election activity as:
[A] public communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal of-
fice (regardless of whether a candidate for State or local office is also mentioned or
identified) and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or op-
poses a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly
138. See Note, supra note 135, at 1328.
139. A current study revealed ample evidence to suggest that soft money now dominates the outcome of
federal elections. See generally CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY: BRIGHAM YOUNG
UNIVERSITY, ELECTION ADVOCACY: SOFT MONEY AND ISSUE ADVOCACY IN THE 2000 CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS, (David B. Magleby ed.) available at http://www.byu.edu/outsidemoney/2000general/contents.htm
(last visited Feb.18, 2001).
140. See Press Release, Fed. Election Comm'n, Party Fundraising Escalates (Nov. 3, 2000), available at
http://www.fec.gov/press/pty00text.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id. Capitalizing on lenient state law, national parties allocated enormous sums of money to the states
during the last election cycle. Soft money transfers by the Democrats totaled $106.5 million, and $98.5 million
for the Republicans. See id.
144. See generally S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001).
145. See id. § 101(b).
146. See id.
147. See id. Federal election activity does not apply to federal officials attending state, local, or district
fundraisers. See id § 101(a). It also does not involve generic campaign activity advocating only candidates for
state, local, or district office. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 101(b) (2001).
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advocates a vote for or against a candidate).1
48
This clause is important because it effectively regulates the "issue ads" that political
parties now use to circumvent FECA and effectively promote particular federal candi-
dates. 149
For federal election activity, McCain-Feingold bans the use and solicitation of soft
money by national political parties.150 Prohibiting national parties' 51 to "solicit, receive,
or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other
thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions,
and reporting requirements of [FECA]' 52 the bill eliminates the hard/soft money dis-
tinction that parties and candidates now manipulate. McCain-Feingold also places simi-
lar restrictions on state, district, and local committees who engage in federal election
activity. '
5 3
Better regulating political parties, McCain-Feingold limits federal election activities
by certain tax-exempt organizations.154 The proposal prohibits national, state, or local
political parties, from receiving or donating funds to tax-exempt entities. 55 Conse-
quently, McCain-Feingold substantially impairs the ability of political parties to avoid
FECA restrictions and exchange large amounts of money with like-minded tax-exempt
organizations.
Regarding federal candidates, McCain-Feingold limits both incumbents and those
seeking office. By eliminating the solicitation and receipt of funds not subject to
FECA, 15 6 McCain-Feingold eliminates a key advantage incumbents enjoy over chal-
lengers. Political parties can no longer use their well-connected challengers and incum-
bents to raise soft money from the special interests buying influence over votes and the
148. Id.
149. These advertisements were used widely, and perhaps illegally, in the 2000 general presidential elec-
tion. See Fred Wertheimer, Gore, Bush, and the Big Lie, WASH. POST, July 24, 2000, A23. They were also
utilized extensively in the 1996 presidential election. See generally RICHARD S. MORRIS, BEHIND THE OVAL
OFFICE (1999) (describing the effectiveness of these advertisements in President Clinton's 1996 re-election
campaign).
150. See S. 27, 107th Cong. § 101(a) (2001).
15 1. This term also includes a political party's national congressional campaign committees, and any
organization or individual acting for a national committee. See id. § 10 1 (a).
152. Id. § 101(a).
153. See id. § 101(a). The bill also regulates "services provided during any month by an employee of a
State, district, or local committee of a political party who spends more than 25 percent of that individual's
compensated time during that month on activities in connection with a Federal election" as federal election
activity. Id. § 101(b).
154. The tax-exempt organizations the bill targets involve those "described in section 501(c) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code (or has submitted an
application for determination of tax exempt status under such section); or . . . described in section 527 of such
Code (other than a political committee)." S. 27, 107th Cong. § 101(a) (2001). A potential concern involves the





legislative agenda. By eradicating the incentive to influence candidates and lawmakers
with huge amounts of soft money, the bill also dismantles the edge wealthier special
interests currently possess over their less affluent counterparts. Thus, McCain-Feingold
should help control special interest dominance and allow more non-partisan, merit-based
ideas to enter the legislative process'
Although McCain-Feingold tightens the solicitation and use of money by political
parties and federal candidates, it increases the amount that FECA allows1 57 individuals
to contribute to political parties. Individuals can contribute $10,000 yearly to state par-
ties.158 The aggregate amount a signal individual may donate increases from $25,000 to
$30,000 per year. 15 9 Although McCain-Feingold does not increase the FECA's individ-
ual contribution limits to candidates, 1
60 lawmakers should consider amending the bill. 161
By increasing the limits individuals can now contribute, an additional proposal would
recognize inflationary changes since 1971 and allow for greater individual participation
in the campaign financing process. Limiting the role of special interests while enhancing
individual influence, an amendment to McCain-Feingold could help increase voter con-
fidence and provide non-incumbents with an opportunity to build better-financed cam-
paigns.' 62 However, lawmakers should be aware that increasing individual contribution
limits may only provide wealthy individuals with greater influence. This does little to
placate the diminished influence less-advantaged young voters still suffer.
1 63
McCain-Feingold also reforms campaign finance disclosure requirements for politi-
cal parties and committees.' 64 More importantly, the bill places restrictions on
electioneering communication.' 65 Exempting independent expenditures and news
stories, 166 McCain-Feingold defines electioneering communication as:
[A]ny broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which--refers to a clearly identi-
fied candidate for Federal office; is made within--60 days before a general, special, or
157. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3).
158. See S. 27, 107th Cong. §102(a).
159. See id. § 102.
160. See 2. U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C).
161. See S. 27, 107th Cong. amend. 149 (2001) (modifying and indexing current hard money contribu-
tion limits). On Mar. 20, 2001, the Senate agreed to S. 27, 107th Cong. amend. 115 (2001) (amending FECA
to modify hard money contribution limits in regard to expenditures from a candidate's personal funds).
162. Perhaps S. 27, 107th Cong. amend. 122 (2001) (amending the Communications Act of 1934 to re-
quire television broadcast providers to offer their lowest rate for political committees buying time on behalf of
candidates) effectively addresses the perceived need raise individual contribution limits by reducing the cost of
campaign television advertisements.
163. Only one percent of all campaign donors contribute the $1,000 maximum. Jim Abrams, Senate to
Vote on Hard Money Limit, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 28, 2001, available at
http:ldailynews.yahoo.comhap/20010328/pl/campaign_finance_84.html. U.S. Senator Christopher Dodd
also argues that raising individual contribution limits might be "getting [us] further and further and further
removed from the average citizen in this country." Id.
164. See generally S. 27, 107th Cong. § 103(a) (2001).




runoff election for such Federal office; or 30 days before a primary or preference
election, or a convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a
candidate, for such Federal office; and is made to an audience that includes members
of the electorate for such election, convention, or caucus. 167
McCain-Feingold requires every person, who disburses $10,000 or more in a calendar
year for an electioneering message, to file a statement within twenty-four hours. 168 Such
persons must disclose their identity, their principal place of business, the election, and
all candidates that the electioneering message targets.' 69 The statement must also illus-
trate all individual disbursements exceeding $200 and all contributors who donated over
$1,000.170 This requirement provides immediate accountability for use of campaign
funds and allows the public to better identify those behind advertisements.
The bill also addresses activity by corporations and labor unions.' 7' The bill allows
non-members, working under a labor agreement, to formally object to the use of fees
used unrelated to collective bargaining. If non-members formally object, unions must
proportionally reduce their dues according to the amount spent on collective bargain-
ing.172 Although this provision implements current case law, a similar restriction affect-
ing corporations may be appropriate.
73
Under McCain-Feingold's electioneering communication provision, 174 for-profit
corporations and labor unions also cannot use treasury funds to pay for television or
radio advertisements thirty days prior to a primary election and sixty days before a gen-
eral election. 75 For 501(c)(4) non-profit organizations, McCain-Feingold only permits
electioneering communications exclusively financed by individual contributors. 176 This
prevents for-profit corporations and labor unions from evading regulation and discreetly
channeling money through 501 (c)(4) organizations.
McCain-Feingold helps clarify the expenditure/contribution debate regarding coor-
dinated 77 electioneering communications. 78 Any electioneering message coordinated
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See S. 27, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001).
170. See id.
171. See id. § 203; §304.
172. See id. § 304 (codifying Communication Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988)).
173. Unfortunately, on Mar. 21, 2001, the Senate tabled S. 27, 107th Cong. amend. 134 (2001) (requiring
disclosure and consent of corporate members and shareholders for the use of funds for political activities). On
Mar. 22, 2001, the Senate also tabled S. 27, 107th Cong. amend. 136 (2001) (requiring corporations to disclose
to members and shareholders the use of money for political purposes).
174. See S. 27, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001).
175. See id. § 203(b).
176. See id.
177. McCain-Feingold essentially describes coordinated activity as the transfer of anything valuable to a
federal candidate, political party, or committee, within the same election cycle, regardless if it definitively
advocates a vote for or against a candidate. The bill also treats coordinated activity as a regulated contribution.
See id. § 214(a)(B).
178. See id. § 202.
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with a federal candidate or a candidate's authorized political committee 179 is treated as a
contribution. 180 Instead of listing coordinated electioneering communication as an un-
regulated expenditure, this revision limits excessive collusion between well-financed
political parties and candidates. It minimizes the power of parties to greatly influence
election outcomes and creates a disincentive for special interests to donate to political
parties.
For independent expenditures,' 8 1 McCain-Feingold requires political parties to
choose how they aid candidates during a general election. Political parties cannot make
coordinated expenditures and unlimited independent expenditures; only one method is
allowed. 182 The bill also creates independent expenditure reporting requirements.
183
Specifically, it targets independent expenditures made toward the end of campaigns. The
bill requires those making independent expenditures in excess of $1,000, after the twen-
tieth day but twenty-four hours prior to an election, to file a report describing the expen-
diture within one day. 184 For those independent expenditures over $10,000, up to and
including the twentieth day before an election, one must file a similar report within two
days.185 McCain-Feingold is also an appropriate continuation in improving disclosure of
independent political organizations. 86 It should help alleviate ambiguity regarding inde-
pendent advertisement authors and help voters better discern advertisement validity.
McCain-Feingold also attacks unethical federal candidates and office holders. The bill
prohibits the conversion of campaign contributions for personal housing payments,
clothes, and car expenses. 187 It outlaws federal candidates and office holders from using
contributions for country or health club memberships, personal vacations, and tuition. 1
88
This provision should help diminish the reputation politicians currently have for using
the public for private gain.
McCain-Feingold also addresses the Clinton/Gore campaign's use of the White
House to raise money during the 1996 presidential race.' 89 In addition to prohibiting
179. This refers to federal, state, or local political parties and committees. See S. 27, 107th Cong. § 202
(2001).
180. See id. § 202. Thus, the contribution cannot exceed the limits set under 2 U.S.C. § 441a.
181. The bill expressly defines independent expenditures as those "expressly advocating the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and that is not a coordinated activity with such candidate or such
candidate's agent or a person who has engaged in coordinated activity with such candidate or such candidate's
agent." S. 27, 107th Cong. § 211 (2001).
182. See id.§ 213.
183. See id. § 212.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. In July, 2000, President Clinton signed a provision into law requiring certain tax exempt organiza-
tions (called "527s") to disclose contribution and expenditures. See generally Act to Amend the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1986, Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000).
187. See S. 27,107th Cong. § 313 (2001).
188. See id.
189. See Young, supra note 6.
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foreign contributions,19 ° McCain-Feingold prohibits federal employees from soliciting
or accepting donations on federal property while discharging official duties. 191 This
section will be crucial in restoring honor and integrity to federal property as a public
possession. Federal property is not, and should never be, a political vehicle to raise
money for the employees we hire.
Finally, McCain-Feingold wisely ensures its overall survival if parts are deemed il-
legal. 192 Reform opponents would enjoy nothing more than to see the entire bill fail due
to one section failing constitutional inspection. 1
93
VI. CONCLUSION
Our current campaign finance system remains a real cause of voter apathy and mis-
trust in government, especially for younger voters. In 1999, Senator McCain com-
mented:
[I]ndisputably, the greatest change in Washington over the past twenty-five years...
has been the preoccupation with money .... It affects the issues raised and their out-
come; it has changed employment patterns in Washington; it has transformed politics;
and it has subverted values. It has led good people to do things that are morally ques-
tionable, if not reprehensible. It has cut a deep gash, if not inflicted a mortal wound in
the concept of public service. 194
While not addressing every campaign finance inequity, McCain-Feingold takes the criti-
cal first-step in restoring accountability and integrity to our current system. Banning soft
money can limit the manipulating role of special interests. It will also direct elected
officials to perform for their constituents, not their campaign contributors. Strengthening
disclosure requirements should provide greater awareness and accountability to the pub-
lic in choosing elected federal officials. Limiting incumbent advantage will provide
greater opportunity for new leaders and new ideas. Most importantly, McCain-Feingold
can help reintroduce young people to a new political process.
If the bill passes through Congress, the true test sits with President George W.
Bush. Failing to win the popular presidential vote, 195 and viewed as beholden to the
special interests that now dominate our current system, 196 the president has an opportu-
nity to illustrate real courage.
190. See S. 27, 107th Cong. § 303 (2001).
191. See id. § 302.
192. See id. § 401.
193. See Abrams, supra note 163.
194. 145 CONG. REC. S12,585-86 (daily ed. October 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. McCain quoting
ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS §4 (1999).
195. See FED. ELECTION COMM'N, 2000 OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, avail-
able at http://fecwebl.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2001).




President Bush has gestured that he might sign McCain-Feingold,' 97 and he should
not hesitate. If the president is truly confident in the power of his ideas, not the strength
of his contributors, he has nothing to lose and America's future has everything to gain.
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